Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Terrorists: An In-Depth Analysis of the Government\u27s Right to Classify United States Citizens Suspected of Terrorism as Enemy Combatants and Try those Enemy Combatants by Military Comission by Schaffer, Amanda
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 30 | Number 4 Article 6
2003
Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Terrorists: An In-
Depth Analysis of the Government's Right to
Classify United States Citizens Suspected of
Terrorism as Enemy Combatants and Try those
Enemy Combatants by Military Comission
Amanda Schaffer
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Amanda Schaffer, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Terrorists: An In-Depth Analysis of the Government's Right to Classify United States
Citizens Suspected of Terrorism as Enemy Combatants and Try those Enemy Combatants by Military Comission, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1465
(2003).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol30/iss4/6
LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE
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AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT TO CLASSIFY
UNITED STATES CITIZENS SUSPECTED OF
TERRORISM AS ENEMY COMBATANTS AND
TRY THOSE ENEMY COMBATANTS BY
MILITARY COMMISSION
Amanda Schaffer*
INTRODUCTION
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks drastically changed atti-
tudes about personal freedom.' Fear that a terrorist could strike at
anytime, anyplace made individuals more willing to put up with
inconveniences, such as longer lines at airport security and baggage
checks in subway stations.2 This fear drove the government to im-
plement measures that it believed would help track down terrorists
and prevent future attacks.3 One such measure, promulgated by
President George W. Bush, is the Military Order of November 13,
2001: "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism."4 Those subject to the order can be
"detained, and, when tried, to be tried for violations of the laws of
war and other applicable laws by military tribunals."5
Section two of the order defines the non-citizens subject to the
order.6 Any non-U.S. citizen is subject to the order where:
[T]here is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant
times, is or was a member of the organization known as al
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2004; B.A., History and
Sociology of Science, Magna Cum Laude, University of Pennsylvania, 2000. I would
like to thank the Editors and Staff of the Fordham Urban Law Journal for their help
with this Comment. I would also like to thank my parents, Lynda and Jeffrey, for
their love and support in every aspect of my life.
1. Oyez! Oyez!, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2002, at A18.
2. Patrick Tyler & Elisabeth Bumiller, A Nation Challenged: The White House;
Bush Offers Taliban '2nd Chance' to Yield; Says He'd Welcome U.N. in Nation Build-
ing; F.B.I. Issues Alert on Signs of New Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2001, at Al.
3. See discussion infra Part II.A.l.
4. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 57,834.
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Qaida; has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to com-
mit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation there-
fore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to
cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citi-
zens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or has know-
ingly harbored one or more individuals described in
subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order.
This order details procedures for handling such non-citizens sus-
pected of terrorism.7
While the order does not specifically give the government the
right to try citizens by military commissions,8 deeming a citizen an
enemy combatant 9 gives the government the authority to try him in
this manner. 10 An individual who is considered an enemy combat-
ant can be detained for the duration of an armed conflict under the
laws and customs of war,11 not under the domestic criminal laws. 12
President Bush has declared that two U.S. citizens, Yaser Esam
Hamdi and Jose Padilla, are enemy combatants, and they are cur-
rently being held in military prisons. 13 It has not yet been deter-
mined what the fate of Hamdi and Padilla will be. 4 They could be
held and not tried at all, they could be tried by military commis-
sions, like their non-citizen colleagues, or they could be tried in
criminal court. 15 This Comment will explore the government's
right to treat citizens as enemy combatants and whether their trials
should be by military commissions or by the non-military criminal
justice system.
Part I of this Comment gives background information and ex-
plains the source of the government's right to determine enemy
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See discussion infra Part I.
10. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 35 (1942) (holding that there is "a class of
unlawful belligerents" not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war and who can be
tried and punished by military commission).
11. See id. at 48. To determine the laws and customs of war, the Court looked to
Article 15 of the Articles of War, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593 (repealed); LiszT, Das
Volkerrecht § 58(B)4 (12 ed. 1925); 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 225 (6th ed.
1940); COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GREAT WAR 208
(1915); J.M. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 283 (1924); J.M. SPAIGHT, WAR
RIGHTS ON LAND 110 (1911); WAR OFFICE, GR. BRIT., MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW
§§ 445, 449 (1929); see infra Part I.B.
12. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48.
13. See Martha Neil, Avoiding the 'Enemy Combatant' Label Some Say Plea by
Taliban Fighter Shows Criminal Prosecutions Work in Terrorism Battle, A.B.A. J. E-
REPORT, July 19, 2002, at 2.
14. See discussion infra Part I.C.
15. See discussion infra Part II.
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combatant status and to use military commissions. Part I also de-
scribes the distinctions between a military trial and a regular crimi-
nal trial and explains the status of the Hamdi and Padilla cases.
Part II explains why the government wants to use military commis-
sions to try terrorists and the advantages of these commissions over
regular criminal proceedings. Additionally, Part II analyzes the
distinctions between citizens and non-citizens and examines the
constitutionality of declaring citizens enemy combatants. Part II
also discusses how terrorists differ from other types of criminals
and how those differences justify disparate treatment. Part III of
this Comment proposes a solution and determines that the govern-
ment does have the right to treat citizens as enemy combatants.
Part III also argues that military commissions should try these en-
emy combatants, however, there must be a structured judicial pro-
ceeding to determine whether an individual is actually an enemy
combatant. 6
I. ORIGINS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT TO USE MILITARY
COMMISSIONS AND TO DETERMINE
ENEMY COMBATANT STATUS
A. Prior Use of Military Commissions
The United States has made use of military tribunals since the
country's inception. 17 The government used the commissions dur-
ing the Revolutionary War, the Mexican Wars, and the Civil War.' 8
The Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin and Application of
Yamashita, declared that it is constitutional to try foreign belliger-
ents in military trials.19
Citizens also have been tried by military commissions in the
past. 0 After the surrender and occupation of Germany and Japan
in 1945, military tribunals tried U.S. citizens for ordinary criminal
16. See discussion infra Part III.B.
17. Byard Q. Clemmons, The Case for Military Tribunals, 49 FED. LAW. 27, 27
(2002).
18. Id. at 27-28. Military tribunals were used during the Civil War to try Confed-
erate soldiers who were captured as saboteurs in civilian clothing or spies. Id. Tribu-
nals were also used during the Mexican War and during the Revolutionary War for
acts of treason. Id.
19. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 35 (1942);
Clemmons, supra note 17, at 28.
20. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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activity in the occupied territories.21 The Supreme Court upheld
the jurisdiction of these tribunals.22 Additionally, in Madsen v.
Kinsella, the Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of a military
commission to try a U.S. citizen for murdering her husband, a U.S.
serviceman. 3 Finally, in Quirin, the Supreme Court upheld the
trial by military commission of a person presumed to be a U.S.
citizen. 4
1. Ex parte Quirin
In Ex Parte Quirin, German saboteurs trained to use explosives,
secret writings, and other terrorist tactics landed in the United
States during World War 11.2 They came ashore while it was dark,
got rid of their German uniforms and changed into civilian clothing
with the intent to destroy U.S. facilities that contributed to the war
effort.26 President Franklin D. Roosevelt set up military commis-
sions to try non-citizens during wartime who were charged with
committing or attempting to commit, "sabotage, espionage, hostile
or warlike acts, or violations of the laws of war.''27 The Supreme
Court held that these military commissions were constitutional,
stating:
[A]n enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly
through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction
of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are
generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of
war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial
and punishment by military tribunals.28
In Quirin, the defendants argued that their trial should be in ci-
vilian court because those courts were open and functioning and
21. Am. Bar Ass'n Task Force on Terrorism & the Law, Report and Recommenda-
tions on Military Commissions, ARMY LAW., Mar. 2002, at 8, 10 [hereinafter Task
Force Recommendations].
22. Id.
23. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 362 (1952).
24. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48.
25. Id. at 21.
26. Id.
27. Juan R. Torruella, On the Slippery Slopes of Afghanistan: Military Commis-
sions and Exercise of Presidential Power, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 648, 668 (2002).
28. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31. Under the Geneva Convention, recognized prisoners
of war have to be charged or repatriated at the end of a conflict, and they are ex-
pected to give only their name, rank, and number when questioned. Thorn Shanker &
Katharine Q. Seeyle, Word for Word/The Geneva Conventions; Who Is a Prisoner of
War? You Could Look It Up. Maybe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, § 4, at 9.
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therefore not precluded from hearing their case; the Supreme
Court rejected that claim.29 The Court held:
Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does
not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is
unlawful because in violation of the law of war. Citizens who
associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy govern-
ment, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country
bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning
of the Hague Convention and the law of war.3 °
Citizenship, therefore, is not an escape from enemy combatant sta-
tus or treatment.
2. Application of Yamashita
In Application of Yamashita, the Supreme Court again allowed
the use of military tribunals to try the Japanese commander of the
Philippines, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, who had massacred ci-
vilians and prisoners of war and destroyed property without cause
or military necessity. 31 In Yamashita, the Court held that the mili-
tary commission was lawful, despite its creation after the cessation
of hostilities between the United States and Japan.32
The reasoning behind Yamashita helps support the constitution-
ality of Congress' authorization of military commissions to remedy
the terror produced by war crimes, "regardless of whether there
are ongoing hostilities at the time of trial. ' 33 This applies to terror-
ism because often the acts of war that a terrorist engages in are
sporadic and do not necessarily occur in one triable offense.34
29. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24, 48; Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 10.
30. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38. The Hague Convention is one of a number of inter-
national conventions that address different legal issues and attempt to standardize
procedures between nations. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 717 (7th ed. 1999). The laws
of war are the body of rules and principles observed by civilized nations for the regu-
lation of matters inherent or incidental to the conduct of a public war, such as the
relations of neutrals and belligerents, blockades, captures, prizes, truces and armi-
stices, capitulations, prisoners, and declarations of war and peace. Id. at 895.
31. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14 (1946); Clemmons, supra note 17, at 28.
32. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 11; Torruella, supra note 27, at 674.
33. Spencer J. Crona & Neal A. Richardson, Justice For War Criminals of Invisible
Armies: A New Legal and Military Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
349, 371 (1996).
34. Id.
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3. The Constitution and Other Sources of Authority
The authority for military commissions comes mainly from Arti-
cles I and II of the Constitution.3 ' Article I gives Congress the
power to "provide for the common Defense ' a6 and to "declare War
... and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water. '37
Article II gives the President "executive Power"38 and makes him
the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. ' 39 Additionally,
Congress, in Article 15 of the Articles of War, provided that "mili-
tary tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses
against the law of war in appropriate cases."40 Article 21 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (which is materially identical to
Article 15) provides:
[T]he provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon
courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost
courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with
respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of
war may be tried by military commission, provost court, or other
military tribunals.4"
B. Differences Between a Military Trial and a
Regular Criminal Trial
A panel of military officers makes up a military tribunal and tries
"both fact and law."42 In the military proceeding, there is no right
to a trial by jury.43 Military commissions do not use the traditional
rules of evidence.44 Instead, evidence is admitted if "in the opinion
of the Presiding Officer,45 the evidence would have probative value
35. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 8-9.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
37. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
38. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
39. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
40. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 9.
41. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
42. Clemmons, supra note 17, at 29. Each commission consists of at least three,
but no more than seven members, the number determined by the appointing author-
ity. DEP'T OF DEF., MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER No. 1, at 2 (2002), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf (last visited May 15,
2003).
43. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 42, at 1-3.
44. Id. at 8-9.
45. Id. at 9. The presiding officer is designated by the appointing authority to pre-
side over the proceedings of that commission. Id. at 3. The presiding officer is a
military officer who is a judge advocate in any of the United States Armed Forces. Id.
The primary responsibilities of the presiding officer are to admit or exclude evidence
at trial, close proceedings, ensure the decorum of the proceedings, act upon any con-
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to a reasonable person. ' 46 This allows the commission to hear evi-
dence that would be inadmissible as hearsay in a non-military crim-
inal trial.47
Further, in a regular criminal court, the jury must unanimously
agree to convict, whereas in a military proceeding two-thirds of the
panel must agree to convict.48
An additional distinction between a military trial and a regular
criminal proceeding is that in a military trial the accused is not free
to select whomever he wants as his attorney.49 He can:
[S]elect a Military Officer who is a judge advocate of any United
States armed force ... [t]he [a]ccused may also retain the ser-
vices of a civilian attorney of the Accused's own choosing...
provided that attorney.., has been determined to be eligible for
access to information classified at the level SECRET or
higher.5 °
This civilian attorney will not necessarily be present at closed
commission proceedings.51 A proceeding can be deemed closed by
the presiding officer of the commission on his "own initiative or
based upon a presentation . . . by either the prosecution or the
defense. '5 2 Closing a proceeding could "include a decision to ex-
clude the Accused, Civilian Defense Counsel, or any other person
... from any trial proceeding or portion thereof."53
C. The Accused Citizen Terrorists: Padilla, Hamdi, and Lindh
1. Jose Padilla
Jose Padilla is thirty-one years old and was born in Brooklyn,
New York. 4 Padilla, who converted to Islam in 1992, was arrested
tempt, ensure the expeditious conduct of the trial, certify all interlocutory question.
Id.
46. Id. at 9.
47. Clemmons, supra note 17, at 29.
48. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 42, at 13. With the exception of cases where the
death penalty would be imposed; in those cases a unanimous vote is needed to con-
vict. Id.
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 8. Grounds for closure include the protection of information classified
or classifiable under Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995)
"Classified National Security Information"; the physical safety of participants in com-
mission proceedings; safety of national security interests. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note
42, at 8.
53. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 42, at 8.
54. Jodi Wilgoren, Traces of Terror: The Bomb Suspect; From Chicago Gang to
Possible al Qaeda Ties, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at A19.
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in Chicago on May 8, 2002 after arriving on a flight from Pakistan
via Zurich. 55 Padilla is currently being held in a military prison in
Charleston, South Carolina. 6 He is known as the "dirty bomber"
and is accused of planning to build and detonate a radioactive
bomb in the United States.57 Padilla had been under surveillance
by U.S. intelligence for at least five weeks before being taken into
custody.5 8 Padilla allegedly lied to U.S. authorities, claiming he
had never been to Afghanistan, and he did not give a clear expla-
nation as to why he was carrying $10,000 in cash in his suitcase.5 9
The "Mobbs Declaration," drafted by Michael Mobbs an official
in the Department of Defense, states the reasons for Padilla's de-
tention and enemy combatant status.6" Only part of the declara-
tion has been released to the public, however.6' The government
has declined to release the parts of the report it deemed to contain
sensitive government information. 6 The released part of the dec-
laration "describes Padilla's multiple contacts with senior al Qaeda
officials while in Pakistan and Afghanistan and their alleged plan
to have him return to the United States on a bombing mission."63
Attorneys for both Hamdi and Padilla filed petitions for a writ of
habeas corpus, claiming that their detention is unlawful.64 The gov-
ernment claims that neither individual has the right to file a habeas
petition. 65 The government also contends that the President's au-
thority as the Commander-in-Chief of the military to classify some-
one as an enemy combatant in wartime cannot be challenged.66
On December 4, 2002, a District Court for the Southern District
of New York ruled that Padilla has a right to meet with his attorney
and to offer evidence to contest the government's allegation that
55. Id.
56. Mark Hamblett, Padilla's 'Combatant' Status Challenged, 228 N.Y. L.J., Oct.
30, 2002, at 1.
57. Stephanie Francis Cahill, In the News: Citizen Held Without Charges as 'En-
emy Combatant' Case of Suspected 'Dirty Bomber' Raises Constitutional Questions,
A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, June 14, 2002, at 2.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Hamblett, supra note 56, at 1.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Mark Hamblett, Scope of Judicial Review in Terror Cases Debated, 228 N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 1, 2002, at 1.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1.
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he is associated with al Qaeda.67 The court also stated that the
President does have the right to detain unlawful combatants, re-
gardless of U.S. citizenship.68 This ruling is being challenged by the
government, which does not want Padilla to have access to his
attorney.69
2. Yaser Esam Hamdi
Yaser Esam Hamdi, a twenty-two-year-old Louisiana-born citi-
zen who moved to Saudi Arabia when he was a toddler, was ar-
rested in Afghanistan while allegedly armed and fighting for the
Taliban.70 The government initially transferred Hamdi to Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba.71 After the government realized Hamdi was a
citizen, however, it sent him to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia.7 2
On January 8, 2003 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Richmond, Virginia, said that it was improper for
courts to probe too deeply into the detention of Hamdi.73 The
court held that a wartime president can indefinitely detain a
United States citizen captured as an enemy combatant on the bat-
tlefield and deny that person access to a lawyer.74 The court addi-
tionally held, "[t]he safeguards that all Americans have come to
expect in criminal prosecutions do not translate neatly to the arena
of armed conflict. In fact, if deference is not exercised with respect
to military judgments in the field, it is difficult to see where defer-
ence would ever obtain. '' 75 Since Hamdi was undisputedly present
in a zone of active combat operations, he does not have the right to
an in depth review of the facts underlying his seizure.76
3. John Walker Lindh
The third U.S. citizen captured as a terrorist suspect is John
Walker Lindh, twenty-one, who served as a Taliban militia member
67. Benjamin Weiser, Threats and Responses: The Courts; Judge Says Man Can
Meet With Lawyer to Challenge Detention as Enemy Plotter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002,
at Al.
68. Id.
69. Benjamin Weiser, Threats and Responses: The Courts; Judge is Angered by
U.S. Stance in Case of 'Dirty Bomb' Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2003, at A5.
70. Frederick N. Egler, Jr., Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 18 LAW. J. 4, 4 (2002).
71. Hamblett, supra note 56, at 1.
72. Egler, supra note 70, at 4.
73. Neil A. Lewis, Threats and Responses: The Courts; Detention Upheld in Com-
batant Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2003, at Al.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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in Afghanistan from August to November 2001.77 He pled guilty to
supplying services to the Taliban and carrying an explosive during
the commission of a felony.78 Despite his terrorist activities, he has
not been declared an enemy combatant.79 The government has not
offered a concrete reason as to why Lindh is not an enemy combat-
ant, while Padilla and Hamdi are. As part of Lindh's plea bargain,
however, he agreed to cooperate in the government's al Qaeda in-
vestigation;80 critics suggest that his cooperation is the reason for
his non-enemy combatant status.81
II. ADVANTAGES OF A MILITARY TRIAL, PROBLEMS WITH
A CRIMINAL TRIAL
A. Arguments Against Trying Accused Terrorists in
Non-Military Courts
Trying suspected terrorists in civilian courts raises various con-
cerns. These include the physical security of the courthouse and
the participants in the trial, and the ability to protect classified in-
formation, including "intelligence sources and methods whose
compromise could facilitate future terrorist acts." '82 Even if a trial
were kept confidential and closed to the press and public, the gov-
ernment could not risk a defendant passing classified information
to other terrorists, or risk the defendant later using the information
himself.8 3
Additionally, in a non-military court, the accused could escape
conviction on a technicality or a jurisdictional issue.84 The relaxed
evidentiary rules of military courts are more likely to prevent this
from happening. According to some prosecutors, the government
is also concerned that allowing a terrorist suspect to have un-
77. Neil, supra note 13, at 2. Lindh was captured in Afghanistan on December 2
or 3, 2001. He was interrogated by the FBI on December 9th and 10th, 2001. During
questioning, Lindh said that he had trained in explosives and firearms at a terrorist
camp run by al Qaeda, had fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the Taliban before he
was captured, had met with Osama bin Laden, and knew that bin Laden had ordered
suicide attacks against the United States. Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged:
The American Captive American Charged as a Terrorist Makes First Appearance in
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at Al.
78. Neil, supra note 13, at 2.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 15.
83. Id. at 14-15.
84. See Crona & Richardson, supra note 33, at 371-74.
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restricted contact with a lawyer could impede an investigation. 85
For example, a lawyer could tell his client to remain silent and not
give information to the government.86 This information could be
vital to the war effort and prevent future terrorist activities.8 7 Fre-
quently, prisoners relent over time; the longer they go without ac-
cess to counsel the more likely they are to reveal information and
cooperate.88 The interest in preventing mass murder by terrorists,
some argue, is more important than the interest in applying the
Miranda rule to the questioning of terrorist suspects.89
1. The President's Rationale
The President's order to try al Qaeda suspects with military com-
missions explains:
[T]he September 11 attacks created a state of armed conflict be-
tween the United States and al Qaeda, that al Qaeda has both
the capability and intention to undertake further terrorist at-
tacks against the United States that could result in mass deaths
and injuries.., and that al Qaeda's actions may place at risk the
continuity of the operations of the U.S. government.9°
The President, therefore, has decided to use military commis-
sions to try non-citizen al Qaeda suspects; to allow for the effective
conduct of military operations and as a means to prevent future
terrorist attacks. 91
a. Support for the Presidential Order
Several military and legal scholars support the President's or-
der.92 Major General Michael J. Nardotti, a retired Judge Advo-
cate General of the Army, stated that military commissions were
needed to address "legitimate concerns for public and individual
safety, the compromise of sensitive intelligence, and due regard for
the practical necessity to use as evidence information obtained in
85. Joseph Bianco, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York
& Eric Seidel, Manhattan District Attorney's Rackets Bureau Deputy Chief , Class
Discussion in Terrorism and the Law, Fordham University School of Law (Nov. 20,
2002).
86. See Crona & Richardson, supra note 33, at 386-87.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 386.
90. Robert C. O'Brien, Trying Circumstances: The Military Commissions that Will
Try the Cases of the Detainees Have Been Established with Appropriate Due Process
Guarantees, 25 L.A. LAW. 48, 51 (2002).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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the course of military operation rather than through traditional law
enforcement means."93 Ruth Wedgwood, a professor of law at
Yale University and member of the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, stated that an "open trial would permit al Qaeda mem-
bers to scrutinize the trial record to see what the government
knows about their operating methods. 94
B. Constitutional Rights: Citizens, Non-Citizens,
and Enemy Combatants
1. The Fifth Amendment
Citizens normally are afforded all the rights guaranteed in the
United States Constitution.95  Included in the Constitution, the
Fifth Amendment requires due process of law and states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger ... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... 96
A terrorist act is potentially a capital offense, and a military trial
would not include a presentment or indictment to a grand jury.97
Therefore, a citizen could argue that trial by a military commission
would violate Fifth Amendment rights.98
Further, a citizen could claim that a determination of enemy
combatant status, without any sort of trial, deprives him of due
process, because enemy combatants are held in prison until the
government decides to release them.99
The government can respond by asserting that because this is a
time of public danger, the lack of presentment or indictment to a
grand jury is acceptable. 100 The government can also argue that
due process is not violated because enemy combatant status is fac-
tually based. 1° 1 Additionally, the government could argue that a
93. Id. (quoting Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Military Commissions, re-
printed in ARMY LAW., Mar. 2002, at 4 (remarks Before the Senate Judiciary Sub-
Committee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts (Dec. 4, 2001))).
94. Id.
95. See infra notes 96-114 and accompanying text.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
97. See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
98. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
99. See infra Part II.B.3.b.
100. See infra Part II.B.3.b.
101. See supra Part I.C.
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military commission would not necessarily deprive an individual of
due process because there are numerous procedures in place to en-
sure that the proceeding is fair.10 2 These procedures include a pre-
sumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.10 3
2. The Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment describes the rights of the accused and
states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the As-
sistance of Counsel for his defense. 10 4
As an enemy combatant, an individual may be held for extended
periods of time without access to counsel. 10 5 If a military commis-
sion tries an enemy combatant, he will not be tried by an impartial
jury. 0 6 Additionally, the presiding officer of the commission has
the right to close the proceeding at any time, removing it from pub-
lic view." 7 A military commission also places a restriction on
whom the accused may choose to represent him.108
3. Case Law and Commentary
Case law and the Supreme Court's interpretation favor the gov-
ernment's position. In Quirin, the Supreme Court allowed the use
of military commissions to try enemy combatants, and held that
these commissions did not violate the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments.10 9 The Supreme Court held:
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments, while guaranteeing the con-
tinuance of certain incidents of trial by jury which Article III,
§ 2 had left unmentioned, did not enlarge the right to jury trial
as it had been established by that Article ... § 2 of Article III
and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments cannot be taken to have
102. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
103. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 42, at 2.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
105. See supra text accompanying note 74.
106. See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
107. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 42, at 2.
108. Id.; see supra Part I.B.
109. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1942).
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extended the right to demand a jury to trials by military commis-
sion .... 11o
Additionally, not all crimes must be tried by a jury. For exam-
ple, "petty offenses triable at common law without a jury" need not
receive a jury trial, and criminal contempt cases where at common
law a jury was not required also do not need to be tried by a jury.111
The mere fact that an individual is tried by the military does not
mean that his trial will be unfair.1 1 2 Professor Lawrence Tribe, a
constitutional law expert, argues, "there is nothing to suggest that
civilian juries in wartime will be any more fair than military tribu-
nals," and that military tribunals could be "less vulnerable to the
emotional pressures and prejudices which could tempt a civilian
jury to convict a person who was factually innocent. 11 3 Individu-
als tried before tribunals are still represented by counsel, are still
presumed innocent, and still must be proven guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." 4
a. "War" Absent a Formal Declaration by Congress
A citizen could argue that because the war on terrorism is not a
declared war," 5 military commissions should not be used. Both
Congress and the Supreme Court have recognized, however, that a
formal declaration of war is not necessary for a state of war to ex-
ist.11 6 The government has argued that "whether a state of armed
conflict exists to which the laws of war apply is a political question
for the President, not the courts to decide."'"17 These tribunals
have been used in other situations where there was no declared
war, such as the Civil War and the Indian Wars. 1 8
Further, the Fourth Circuit, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, has recently
held that "[t]he unconventional aspects of the present struggle do
not make its stakes any less grave" or lessen the military's author-
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. See infra notes 11.3-114 and accompanying text.
113. Clemmons, supra note 17, at 30.
114. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 42, at 2.
115. A declared war defines the enemy as another state and its nationals, and
marks a clear beginning and end to the conflict with a legal act or instrument marking
its conclusion. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 10.
116. Id. at 11; see infra text accompanying notes 117-121.
117. Respondent's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Petition
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 8, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02 Civ. 4445) (referring to the holding in The Prize Cases, 67
U.S. 635 (1862)).
118. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 11.
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ity to hold enemy combatants. 119 Additionally, Article 21 does not
specify that there must be a declared war in order for military com-
missions to be used.120 Finally, in Talbot v. Seeman, the Supreme
Court recognized the ability of Congress to declare a "partial war"
targeted at a specific type of enemy aggression even if we are not at
war with an enemy nation in the traditional sense. 121
b. Extrapolation of the President's Order to Citizens
A citizen can point out that the President's order is directed at
non-citizens, and, therefore, citizens should not be tried by military
commissions and should not be declared enemy combatants. A
joint Congressional resolution, enacted on September 18, 2001,
however, authorized the President "to. use all necessary and appro-
priate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he de-
termines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001 .... ",2 The President could, there-
fore, include military commissions under "necessary and appropri-
ate force."'1
24
Additionally, Congress has accepted that the President's Com-
mander-in-Chief powers during wartime include authorizing the
detention of enemy belligerents. 25 The provisions of 10 U.S.C.
§ 956(5) support the "expenditure of funds for the detention of
'prisoners of war' and persons-such as enemy combatants-'simi-
lar to prisoners of war,"' indicating Congress' understanding that
the military can capture and hold enemy combatants, including citi-
zens, during wartime. 2 6
A citizen could argue that a declaration that he is an enemy com-
batant violates 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a). 127 This statute "prohibits the
detention of a United States citizen without a specific authorization
119. Id. at 9 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002)).
120. See Respondent's Reply Brief at 9, Padilla (No. 02 Civ. 4445).
121. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 28 (1801). Talbot involved a ship that was taken
during 1799 when the United States and France were in a state of partial war. The
Court deliberated over whether it was lawful to take a ship at this time. Id.; see Crona
& Richardson, supra note 33, at 360.
122. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
123. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 11 (citing Pub. L. No. 107-40,
115 Stat. 224 (2001)).
124. Id. at 11.
125. Respondent's Reply Brief at 16, Padilla (No. 02 Civ. 4445).
126. Id. at 17.
127. See infra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
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by an act of Congress." '128 The legislative history of this statute
indicates Congress' intention to repeal the Emergency Detention
Act, which allowed the "detention of each person as to whom there
is reasonable ground to believe that such persons will engage in, or
probably will conspire with others to engage in acts of espionage or
of sabotage. ' 129 This suggests that the government does not have
the right to detain citizens like the two that are currently being
considered enemy combatants. 130
The government can counter this argument by claiming that
§ 4001(a) does not apply to enemy combatants during times of
war.13 1 This statute was specifically placed in Title 18, which per-
tains to "Crimes and Criminal Procedure," instead of Title 10 or 50,
which govern the "Armed Forces" and "War and National De-
fense. ' 132 Additionally, if this statute did apply in wartime, a citi-
zen could never be classified as an enemy combatant regardless of
his actions.1 33 This would directly contradict the holding in Quirin,
declaring that citizens can be considered enemy combatants. 34
Also, § 4001(a) does not apply to detentions "pursuant to an Act of
Congress," and in this case, Congress has given the President sup-
port for "all necessary and appropriate force. '135
Another way for a citizen to challenge the government's author-
ity to declare him an enemy combatant is to rely upon the Posse
Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385.136 This Act, created to prevent
abuses by the military,1 37 prohibits the military from involvement
in civilian law enforcement.1 38 Declaring a suspected terrorist an
enemy combatant and holding him in a military prison seemingly
violates this Act.139 The government can argue, however, that the
128. Petitioners' Brief in Support of the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and in Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at 6, Padilla ex rel. New-
man v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02 Civ. 445).
129. Id. at 7.
130. Id.
131. See Respondent's Reply Brief at 18, Padilla (No. 02 Civ. 4445).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 19.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 20.
136. Petitioners' Brief in Support of the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and in Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at 6, Padilla ex rel. New-
man v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02 Civ. 445).
137. Id.
138. Id. The Act is intended to prevent the military from taking over civilian gov-
ernment and suspending constitutional liberties. Bissonette v. Haig, 485 U.S. 264, 264
(1988).
139. See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
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act is directed at civilian law enforcement and, therefore, should
not apply to the military matter of detention of enemy combat-
ants.1 n It is "the exercise of a core military function to safeguard
the national security in a time of war."14'
Citizens can also argue that the U.S. government has protested
the use of military tribunals to try its citizens in other countries, yet
they are considering the use of these tribunals within their own
country.142 The government can respond, however, that as long as
reasonable procedural safeguards are in place, military commis-
sions can be mechanisms for a fair trial and do not violate due pro-
cess, and that the foreign commissions they oppose are not as fairly
constructed. 43
C. Treating Terrorists Differently from Other
Types of Criminals
Terrorists involved with al Qaeda could have information that, if
exposed in a regular criminal proceeding, could threaten national
security. 144 The Pentagon and other intelligence agencies are un-
willing to allow suspects access to certain witnesses and evidence
that could compromise this security.145 The government argues
that it has a justified interest in keeping terrorists in isolation and
under interrogation. 46 Without access to witnesses, however, a
suspect in the regular criminal justice system would be deprived of
his Sixth Amendment right to seek witnesses that could exonerate
him. 14
7
The criminal justice system is designed to "err on the side of let-
ting the guilty go free rather than convicting the innocent.' 48 Ar-
guably, this is not a good method for dealing with a terrorist linked
to a network such as al Qaeda and the September 11th attacks.
Another problem with a criminal trial is that potential jurors
could fear that conviction of the suspect would place their lives in
140. See Respondent's Reply Brief at 21, Padilla (No. 02 Civ. 4445).
141. Id.
142. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 15.
143. Id.
144. See supra Part II.A.
145. See supra Part II.A.
146. Philip Shenon & Eric Schmitt, Threats and Responses: the 9/11 Suspect; White
House Weighs Letting Military Tribunal Try Moussaoui, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2002, at A17.
147. Id.
148. Clemmons, supra note 17, at 31 (citing Crona & Richardson, supra note 33, at
379).
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danger.149 Additionally, a public trial would not keep sensitive in-
formation secure and could "disclose methods and sources to the
enemy. "150
As to the different evidence rules, the normal rules of evidence
could make it difficult for the court to learn the truth.1 51 The intro-
duction of hearsay gives the tribunal more information, and the
more information the tribunal has, the more credible its decision
will be.15 2
Another advantage of military tribunals is that the proceedings
take less time. 153 This faster process is necessary because terrorism
is an ongoing threat. 54 "Trials to the court are shorter than jury
trials by at least one-half.' 1 55 This speed is exemplified by the dif-
ference in trial length between the first World Trade Center bomb-
ing trial and the Yamashita case. The World Trade Center case
involving 207 witnesses took over five months (from November
1993 to March 1994) while the Yamashita case heard 286 witnesses
and 3,000 pages of testimony in a little more than five weeks.' 56
Citizens accused of terrorism are not being tried by military
tribunals for ordinary criminal activity. 57 Their behavior can be
construed as violations of the laws of war, therefore, it is legitimate
to try them by military commissions.1 58 They acted under the di-
rection of al Qaeda while in civilian clothing, and they committed
acts of aggression against innocent, noncombatant civilians and
their property, thus violating the laws of war. 59 While al Qaeda is
not an independent state, the laws of war also apply to non-state
actors, such as insurgents. 60 In fact, al Qaeda itself claims they are
waging a jihad against the United States. 61
Further, terrorist acts transcend ordinary criminal acts and,
therefore, terrorists should not be tried by the criminal justice sys-
tem.162 Spencer Crona, a Denver attorney and writer of an award-
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See infra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
154. See supra Introduction.
155. Crona & Richardson, supra note 33, at 387.
156. Clemmons, supra note 17, at 31.
157. See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
158. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 11.
159. See id. at 12.
160. Id.
161. See Crona & Richardson, supra note 33, at 351.
162. Id. at 354.
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winning essay on international law, and Neal Richardson, a Deputy
District Attorney for Denver who has written about constitutional
issues, feel that "terrorism is not a social problem susceptible to
civilian intervention and law enforcement, but a military threat and
menace to our civilization appropriate for military repulsion. "163
Finally, as noted above, some believe that terrorists need to be
detained as enemy combatants for the duration of the armed con-
flict to ensure that they do not aid the enemy and gather additional
intelligence that would hurt the U.S. war effort.1 64 They are not
being held for punishment purposes. 65 Therefore, they are not be-
ing punished without due process merely because they are being
detained in a military prison.16
6
III. MILITARY TRIBUNALS: IF THEY ARE FAIR,
THEY ARE APPROPRIATE
A. Specific Steps to Ensure Fairness
The United States must take into account the implications of its
actions on future circumstances. If we try our own citizens with
military commissions, what is to prevent other countries from try-
ing U.S. citizens this way? The government must therefore ensure
that these commissions are fair and give defendants a presumption
of innocence.
These tribunals should only be used when there is a compelling
security interest at stake.' 67 It is important to ensure that those
tried by military commissions are given a "full and fair trial.'
'1 68
Some principles that could ensure fairness include an independent
and impartial tribunal with proceedings open to the press and the
public, except for specific and compelling reasons,'169 and the fol-
lowing rights for the defendant: presumption of innocence; prompt
notice of charges; trial without undue delay; to be present; to ex-
amine, or have examined, the witnesses against him; to the free
163. Id. at 357.
164. See Respondent's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Peti-
tion for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 22, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp.
2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02 Civ. 4445).
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text.
167. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 17.
168. Id. at 18.
169. Id.
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assistance of an interpreter; and not to be compelled to testify
against himself or confess guilt.170
B. A Better System to Determine if a Citizen is
an Enemy Combatant
While the courts have traditionally given great deference to "the
President's wartime detention decisions," there must be some sys-
tem of review to determine enemy combatant status.171 Otherwise,
certain citizens will live in fear that they could be picked up off the
street and declared an enemy combatant at the whim of the Presi-
dent. 172 While the country is in a state of increased fear and anger
and is more willing to accept the detention of citizens, there must
be a fair system of review to ensure that the government has good
cause in declaring that an individual is an enemy combatant. 3
Because of national security issues, the government should have
the right to declare someone an enemy combatant and detain him
for the duration of the armed conflict. 174 If a citizen is legitimately
declared an enemy combatant, the President's Executive Order
should apply and a military commission should try him. The cur-
rent standard of review to determine enemy combatant status,
however, is not enough. 75 A procedural system needs to be in
place to make certain that individuals are not unfairly deemed en-
emy combatants. A set standard of review to determine enemy
combatant status will give U.S. citizens fair warning of the conse-
quences of terrorist acts.
The process for determining enemy combatant status will need
to be top secret to guarantee that sensitive information is not re-
leased. 76 It could be comprised of a panel of three to five judges
nominated by the President and approved with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, similar to the way in which Supreme Court jus-
tices are appointed.177 The defendant will have the right to have
the attorney of his choice, as long as the attorney can pass security
170. Id. Principles taken from Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. Id.
171. See Respondent's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Peti-
tion for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 24, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp.
2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02 Civ. 4445).
172. See discussion supra Part III.A.
173. See discussion supra Part III.A.
174. See supra Part I.A.1.
175. See discussion supra Part I.C.
176. See discussion supra Part I.C.
177. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
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clearance. The standard of review will be probable cause and the
evidentiary rules will be similar to that of a grand jury proceeding,
where hearsay is admissible. This is necessary because of the diffi-
culty in establishing these cases, and because witnesses may also be
terrorists who are unlikely to cooperate or who are out of the
country. The standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is too high
for cases such as these. Although it should be ensured that civil
rights of the accused are not violated, the standard cannot be so
high that it is impossible for the government to make its case. The
decision of this special court will be final and will not be subject to
review, ensuring that the case is not held up by way of lengthy and
expensive appeals.178
Claiming that someone is an enemy combatant when he is inno-
cent could destroy that person's life, and contravenes the constitu-
tional principles we hold dear. The approach suggested in this
Comment would decrease the chances of that happening. While it
is possible that some innocent people could slip through cracks in
the system and be declared enemy combatants without merit, the
minimal risk is warranted considering the large-scale destruction of
life and property that terrorists affect.1 79 Blackstone, in a commen-
tary on the terrorists of his era, said:
Lastly, the crime of piracy, or robbery and depredation upon the
high seas, is an offence [sic] against the universal law of society;
a pirate being, according to Sir Edward Coke, hostis humani
generis. As therefore he has renounced all the benefits of soci-
ety and government, and has reduced himself afresh to the sav-
age state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind, all
mankind must declare war against him: so that every community
hath a right, by the rule of self-defense, to inflict that punish-
ment upon him, which every individual would in a state of na-
ture have been otherwise entitled to do, for any invasion of his
person or personal property.18
0
The United States must defend itself against terrorism. One of
our best defense mechanisms is the ability to detain terrorists, min-
imizing their ability to harm innocent civilians. Another important
defense mechanism is the capacity to try terrorists by military com-
missions so they have swift trials designed to extract fact and are
178. Crona & Richardson, supra note 33, at 395. This is in line with the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg which stated that the judgment of
the tribunal was final and not reviewable. Id.
179. Id. at 406.
180. Id. at 406-07 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *71).
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less likely to create a situation in which a terrorist is released on a
technicality. These commissions are a much more effective and le-
gally appropriate way to try and punish terrorists.'8 Just as the
U.S. military would not hand over our guns and tanks on the bat-
tlefield, so too should the legal system refuse to hand over our legal
defense mechanisms and allow terrorists to roam the streets of our
country while it is under attack.
181. Id. at 349.
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